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A protection profile for high-robustness separation ker-
nels has recently been validated and several implementa-
tions are under development. However, medium-robustness
separation kernel development efforts have no protection
profile, although the US Government has published guid-
ance for authoring such a profile.
As a step toward a protection profile, a set of security
requirements for medium-robustness separation kernels is
proposed. These requirements result from an informal, yet
principled, approach. By bracketing the problem with ap-
propriate reference points and elaborating a method for in-
terpolating the requirements both a measure of uniformity
and a basis for further discussion are achieved. Our refer-
ence points include the high robustness protection profile,
the existing medium robustness consistency instruction, and
our familiarity with the nuances of separation kernels.
This practitioner-oriented study is intended to advance
the prevailing practices for commercial software develop-
ment, which presently falls far short of the rigor needed
for either high-robustness or medium-robustness systems.
These requirements represent an incremental improvement
in the pursuit of secure software — and is intended to be a
step forward on the road to higher assurance.
1 Introduction
The separation kernel [Rus81] has emerged as a promis-
ing foundation for the construction of highly secure systems
[VBC+05]. In such applications a separation kernel must
exhibit high robustness in the face of attacks by resourceful
adversaries against high-value resources under its control.
Robustness
The Common Criteria addresses only functionality
and assurance, not robustness. The U.S. Department
of Defense defines three level of robustness: high,
medium and basic. In this context robustness is “a
characterization of the strength of a security func-
tion, mechanism, service or solution, and the assur-
ance (or confidence) that it is implemented and func-
tioning correctly.” [DOD03] The robustness of a
TOE represents the TOE’s ability to mitigate security
threats in its operational environment. High robust-
ness requires the security mechanisms to “provide
the most stringent protection and rigorous security
countermeasures” whereas medium robustness im-
poses requirements for “layering of addtitional safe-
guards above good commercial practices.” [DOD03]
Best commerical practices are considered as basic
robustness.
The Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP)
[SKP07] provides a set of security functional require-
ments (SFRs) and security assurance requirements (SARs)
for separation kernels that will be employed in environ-
ments requiring high robustness. It admits implementa-
tions ranging from statically-configured partitioning kernels
with coarse-grained information flow control enforcement
through dynamically-configured kernels with a richer set of
exported resources and corresponding fine-grained informa-
tion flow control policy enforcement [LIN06].
Not every environment, however, requires such a high
degree of robustness, since physical access constraints may
guarantee a level of trustworthiness of individuals having
access to the system. In such applications a medium-
robustness separation kernel (MR SK) may suffice. Never-
theless, the prospect of using a common set of components
and approaches to security engineering problems provides
motivation for the existence of separation kernels that are
largely feature-comparable to their high-robustness coun-
terparts, but which are required to exhibit only medium ro-
bustness.
The U.S. Government has recognized a need for such a
class of separation kernels, as evidenced by at least two de-
velopments: the publication by NSA of guidence for the
application of both high- and medium-robustness separa-
tion kernels [NSA05b], and the determination by some DoD
programs of the adequacy of a medium-robustness separa-
tion kernel for certain applications.
A proper protection profile (PP) for medium-robustness
separation kernels would present both SFRs and SARs de-
rived by a methodical analysis of the security environment
and security objectives following the model of the Common
Criteria [CC205].
This study proposes a set of requirements for medium-
robustness separation kernels. Though informally derived,
in contrast with the detailed analysis and justification re-
quired in a PP, these requirements are based on an interpo-
lation of reliable sources informed by our familiarity with
separation kernel requirements. We hope that providing this
study can facilitate and provide consistency among ongo-
ing development efforts, as well as offer a stepping stone
to a PP. In addition, the separation kernel is one of many
potential targets of evaluation that could exist in both high-
robustness and medium-robustness implementations, hence
a viable repeatable method for “requirements interpolation”
could provide wider benefit.
2 Methodology
We wanted to study the security requirements for separa-
tion kernels suitable for deployment in environments requir-
ing medium robustness, without taking on the considerable
commitment of developing a protection profile.
We hypothesized that, given knowledge of the validated
high-robustness SKPP, of medium-robustness consistency
guidance, and of the nuances of separation kernels, then it
would be possible to arrive systematically at a good approx-
imation of the requirements for a medium-robustness sepa-
ration kernel without incurring the expense of PP develop-
ment.
The method should establish the reference points and the
reasoning to be applied to allow interpolation of each re-
quirement for medium robustness. Determining this a pri-
ori would reduce the variance of discretion applied among
requirements. If a result appeared unsatisfactory, it could be
analyzed to determine why, and then the method tuned and
reapplied.
A strategic choice was to use the rationale provided in
the SKPP as a key reference, because it is the most detailed
written repository of knowledge concerning what makes
a separation kernel unique. By applying rationale similar
to that used in the SKPP, and making only the necessary
changes while adjusting for the reduced assurance level, it is
possible to have reasonable confidence that this informally
derived set of requirements is a close approximation to that
obtainable by a more rigorous analysis.
The methodology involved the following steps:
1. Collect relevant and documentation sources to con-
sider for medium robustness guidance and, based on
their applicability to this study, choose the final set to
be relied upon.
2. Determine whether any security functional require-
ments in the SKPP could be dispensed with outright,
or weakened, in a medium-robustness separation ker-
nel.
3. Decide and finalize the functional requirements for a
medium-robustness separation kernel, giving prefer-
ence to functional interchangeability with the high-
robustness separation kernel
4. Consider, in turn, each assurance family identified in
the SKPP.
5. Identify an appropriate assurance component for each
family based on the decision process detailed below in
the Security Assurance Requirements section.
The functional and assurance requirements will be enumer-
ated in later sections. The remainder of this section dis-
cusses the selection of sources used for the activity.
The assurance/robustness guidance documents identified
for initial consideration were:
1. Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [SKP07]
2. Common Criteria (CC) [CC205]
3. US Government Protection Profile for Multilevel Op-
erating Systems in Environments Requiring Medium
Robustness (MLOSPP)[MLO07]
4. IA Guidance for Systems Based on a Security Real-
Time OS (IAG) [NSA05b]
5. Medium Robustness Consistency Instruction Manual
(MR-CIM)[NSA05a]
The IAG recommends the use of “a Medium Robustness
SRTOS1 or a High Robustness SRTOS, depending on the
scenario and a variety of factors.” Further, it states that a PP
should comply with the MR-CIM and, as a starting point,
use the security requirements from the SKPP and the assur-
ance requirements from the MLOSPP.
A multilevel operating system is very different from a
separation kernel. The MLOSPP describes a full-featured
operating system with label-based security policy enforce-
ment. The SKPP describes a minimal operating system that
lacks not only label-based security but most of the services
required of an OS meeting the MLOSPP. A separation ker-
nel could be used as the foundation for implementing the
features of a multilevel operating system, and must have at
least the strength of function of any mechanism it is used
to support. A version of the MLOSPP had been consulted
as the SKPP was being developed, and its influence has al-
ready been distilled and filtered through the SKPP refine-
ment process. Given the other more appropriate resources
at our disposal we chose not to directly rely further upon the
MLOSPP for the present exercise.
The IAG-provided guidance regarding medium-
robustness separation kernel requirements is indirect: it
merely cites other documents as sources for guidance. The
documents cited are among those we considered, and the
approach suggested by the IAG is very similar to the one
described here, with the exception of the exclusion of the
MLOSPP.
3 Security Functional Requirements
The SKPP describes a broad class of separation kernels.
It is assumed that a medium-robustness separation kernel
would be employed in a fashion architecturally similar to
its high-robustness counterpart [NSA05b], though in a more
sheltered environment. A medium-robustness separation
kernel protection profile should reflect this assumption, as
it engenders a commonality of components and approaches
across the assurance spectrum, fostering cost savings and
adaptability to changing environmental requirements.
For situations in which a SK security architecture is
developed for an environment requiring medium robust-
ness and then is later applied to an environment requiring
high robustness, it would be advantageous if the medium-
robustness separation kernel could be replaced by a high-
robustness separation kernel with little or no architectural
change. Therefore, it is proposed that a medium-robustness
separation kernel have SFRs not substantially different from
a high-robustness separation kernel, with the minor excep-
1The IAG defines an SRTOS as “a separation kernel-based Real-Time
Operating System that has undergone an appropriate security evaluation.”
In this study, such an operating system is generically referred to as a “sep-
aration kernel.”
tions noted in the following section. Thus, the greatest dif-
ference between a high-robustness separation kernel and a
medium-robustness separation kernel would be the SARs.
4 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for evaluation of
a medium-robustness separation kernel should be less de-
manding than those of the high-robustness SKPP. Table 1
summarizes the proposed SARs using SKPP nomenclature,
providing information from the source documents for com-
parison and a reference to the discussion in the following
sections. According to convention, component numbers not
in parentheses (e.g., “3”) indicate an unmodified component
from the Common Criteria catalog of SARs, while those
in parentheses (e.g., “(3)”) indicate an explicit requirement.
Numbering of explicit assurance components can be mis-
leading. “(1)” is not necessarily a less demanding require-
ment than that represented by a “3,” or that represented by
an explicit requirement “(2)” in another document. Some
authors start numbering explicit requirements within a fam-
ily starting at 1, while others use the number of the CC com-
ponent most closely matching the explicit component. The
“ x’ ” and “ x* ” designations represent a decrease in the
component leveling defined by the SKPP and MR CIM, re-
spectively. The rationale for these changes is provided in the
subsections associated with the corresponding families. The
EAL 4 and EAL 6 columns represent the security assurance
requirements in the standard package for each EAL given
in Version 2.3 of the Common Criteria. The SKPP (HR)
column gives the SARs from Version 1.03 of the SKPP.
The MR CIM column gives the generic medium robustness
requirements recommended by the Consistency Instruction
Manual.
Though many of the MR SK requirements may corre-
spond to those of MR CIM, a wholesale adoption of the MR
CIM requirements is not appropriate for a separation kernel.
Special considerations arise from the nature of a separation
kernel TOE qua separation kernel, and these considerations
apply generally to a MR SK as well as to one of high robust-
ness, though the degree to which they may apply must be
determined. These considerations played a role in defining
the requirements presented here for a medium robustness
separation kernel.
In some cases the medium-robustness requirement is de-
rived in a similar manner to that of the corresponding SKPP
requirement, though placed lower in the assurance hierar-
chy. As an example, consider the Functional Specifica-
tion (ADV FSP) family. The CC EAL 6 package spec-
ifies component “3” (ADV FSP.3). The SKPP specifies
ADV FSP EXP.4, a tailored version of component “4,”
while our medium-robustness requirement replaces the CC
EAL 4 component “2” with a tailored version of component
Table 1. Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Assurance EAL6 SKPP EAL4 MR MR MR SK See
Class Family CCv2.3 (HR) CCv2.3 CIM SK Comment Section
ACM AUT 2 2 1 1 1 MR CIM
Config Mgmt ACM CAP 5 5 4 4 4 MR CIM §5.2
ACM SCP 3 3 2 2 2 MR CIM
Delivery and ADO DEL EXP 2 (2) 2 2 (2) NIST crypto §5.3.1
Operation ADO IGS 1 1 1 1 1 §5.3.2
ADV ARC EXP (1) (1) (1) MR adjusted §5.4.1
ADV CTD EXP (1) (1) SKPP §5.4.2
ADV FSP EXP 3 (4) 2 1 (3) semiformal §5.4.3
ADV HLD EXP 4 (4) 2 1 (4) SKPP §5.4.4
ADV IMP EXP 3 (3) 1 2 2 MR CIM §5.4.5
Development ADV INI EXP (1) (1) SKPP §5.4.6
ADV INT EXP 2 (3) (1) (1) MR CIM §5.4.7
ADV LLD EXP 2 (2) 1 (1) (1) MR CIM §5.4.8
ADV LTD EXP (1) (1) SKPP §5.4.9
ADV RCR EXP 2 3 1 1 2 semiformal §5.4.10
ADV SPM EXP 3 3 1 1 3 formal §5.4.11
Guidance AGD ADM EXP 1 (1) 1 1 (1) SKPP §5.5
Documents AGD USR 1 1 1 1 1
ALC DVS 2 2 1 1 1 MR CIM
Life Cycle ALC FLR 3 2 2 MR CIM §5.6
Support ALC LCD 2 2 1 1 1 MR CIM
ALC TAT 3 3 1 1 2 + impl stds
Assur. Maint AMA AMP EXP (1) (1) SKPP §5.7
APT PDF EXP (1) (1’) mod’d SKPP §5.8.1
Platform APT PSP EXP (1) (1’) mod’d SKPP §5.8.2
Assurance APT PCT EXP (1) (1’) mod’d SKPP §5.8.3
APT PST EXP (1) (1’) mod’d SKPP §5.8.4
APT PVA EXP (1) (1’) mod’d SKPP §5.8.5
ATE COV 3 3 2 2 2 MR CIM
Tests ATE DPT 2 3 1 2 2 MR CIM §5.9
ATE FUN 2 2 1 1 1 MR CIM
ATE IND 2 3 2 2 2 MR CIM
AVA CCA EXP 2 (2) 2 (1*) interpartition §5.10.1
Vulnerability AVA MSU 3 3 2 2 2 MR CIM §5.10.2
Assessment AVA SOF 1 1 1 1 1 MR CIM §5.10.3
AVA VLA EXP 4 (4) 2 3 3 MR CIM §5.10.4
“3.” In a very few cases, the specified medium-robustness
requirement is identical to that specified in the SKPP. Spe-
cific considerations influencing the determination of appro-
priate components are discussed in the following section.
5 Discussion of the Assurance Requirements
The following subsections describe the rationale used to
derive the MR SK assurance requirements for each assur-
ance class. In cases where explicit requirements from the
SKPP are applicable to the MR SK, excerpts from the SKPP
rationale for those explicit requirements are included.
5.1 A Note on Semiformal Style
It was necessary to define an appropriate guideline for
“semiformal” for this study since the range of what can
qualify as semiformal is very broad. Informal is defined
as natural language, formal is defined as a restricted syn-
tax language with formal semantics, and semiformal is any-
thing in between. This would admit natural language with
paragraph headings at one extreme and formal specification
languages without a formal semantics at the other extreme.
To avoid ambiguity there needs to be a common lan-
guage among the designer, the implementer, and the eval-
uator such that requirements can be interpreted the same by
all. At a minimum, for semiformal notation we recommend
a language with a defined syntax and a well-documented
informal semantics that can support reasonably unambigu-
ous compositional reasoning required for correspondence
demonstration of evaluation evidences.
5.2 Configuration Management
The ACM class contains three families: CM Automation
(AUT), CM Capabilities (CAP), and CM Scope (SCP). The
requirements in this class are straightforward. The SKPP
directly adopts the standard EAL 6 components for each
family in the ACM class. The MR CIM similarly adopts the
EAL 4 component. We follow EAL 4 and the MR CIM by
requiring ACM AUT.1, ACM CAP.4 and ACM SCP.2.
5.3 Delivery and Operation
The critical nature of delivery is easily overlooked, but
it provides a prime opportunity for subversion [Mye80]. In
an environment where a separation kernel is used to isolate
levels of sensitive information, though it is accessed only
by trustworthy users, undetected subversion during delivery
could compromise critical missions. Therefore adoption of
the SKPP required components with the modifications dis-
cussed below is recommended.
5.3.1 Delivery (ADO DEL)
While MR CIM requires only component ADO DEL.2 (de-
tection of modification and of attempts to masquerade as the
developer), which is the same for both EAL 4 and EAL 6,
it was determined for the SKPP that an explicit requirement
was needed. The use of NIST-approved cryptographic sig-
nature algorithms and keyed-hash message authentication
functions to support trusted delivery of the TOE was re-
quired. Starting with the base CC component ADO DEL.2,
elements were added to require the developer to provide
documentation for trusted delivery and to demonstrate the
use of NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms in support
of their trusted delivery processes, thus providing additional
assurance against undetected tampering.
The following application note is suggested for the
medium-robustness requirements: though it may be pos-
sible to meet the delivery requirements without the use
of cryptography, if technical measures are used to sat-
isfy ADO DEL EXP.1 and those measures include cryp-
tographic mechanisms, then such mechanisms should im-
plement NIST-approved algorithms, though certification is
not required. The additional evaluator action to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the strength of mechanism for
the trusted delivery mechanism required by the SKPP in
ADO DEL EXP.2.2E has been dropped.
5.3.2 Installation, Generation and Start-Up
(ADO IGS)
The Common Criteria only defines two components for this
family, ADO IGS.1 and ADO IGS.2; however, all of the
CC standard EAL packages, as well as the SKPP and the
MR CIM adopt ADO IGS.1. Likewise, for medium robust-
ness, only ADO IGS.1 has been included.
5.4 Development
The ADV class contains the assurance families: Archi-
tectural Design (ARC), Configuration Tool Design (CTD),
Functional Specification (FSP), High-Level Design (HLD),
Implementation Representation (IMP), Trusted Initializa-
tion (INI), TSF Internals (INT), Low-Level Design (LLD),
Load Tool Design (LTD), Representation Correspondence
(RCR), and Security Policy Modeling (SPM) as described
in the following subsections.
5.4.1 Architectural Design (ADV ARC)
This assurance family is not present in the Common Crite-
ria Version 2.3 but it has been explicitly included in the MR
CIM, in other medium-robustness protection profiles, and
in the SKPP. In the case of the SKPP, it was recognized that
a new assurance criterion was necessary to require assur-
ance evidence specific to the TSF architecture and its abil-
ity to protect itself, to support the principle of least privi-
lege for the purpose of damage limitation, and to prevent
TSF-internal denial of service by executing in a predictable
manner. ADV ARC EXP.1 was created to address these re-
quirements. It is worth noting that several assurance ele-
ments in ADV ARC EXP.1 are related to SFRs. Thus the
testable desired behavior of the TOE in terms of functional
requirements is precisely defined as are the assurances re-
quired to determine that the desired behavior is achieved by
the implementation.
For medium robustness, a similar explicit ADV ARC
component should be defined and the assurance levied
must be commensurate with the degree of scope, depth
and rigor provided by the functional specification, high-
level design and the TSF internals description. As stated
in the application note for ADV ARC EXP.1 in the SKPP,
“the architecture design required by this component is at
the level of the functional specification and high-level de-
sign documentation. The TSF internals description re-
quired by ADV INT EXP.3 component is at the level of
TSF module documentation.” This reasoning leads to
medium robustness for the adjusted rigor of the func-
tional specification, high-level design, and internals de-
scription. These adjustments are subsumed by the wording
of ADV ARC EXP.1.2C, which states that the architectural
design “shall be at a level of detail commensurate with the
description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in
the TOE high-level design documentation.”
5.4.2 Configuration Tool Design (ADV CTD)
This assurance family is not defined in the Common Criteria
but explicitly added by the SKPP to address concerns about
the validity of the configuration vector(s) that the separation
kernel relies on to establish the initial secure state and to
enforce the partition flow policy. The configuration vector
has a direct bearing on the ability to produce an inductive
proof of the basic security theorem2.
The configuration vector is generated and validated by a
configuration tool. Because the configuration tool is part of
the TOE but not part of the TSF, it is not subject to most
of the ADV documentation SARs. The absence of a CC as-
2The Basic Security Theorem establishes that the system never enters
an unsecure state. A proof of the BST typically takes the form of an induc-
tion on states, comprising a secure initial state(s) and security invariant-
preserving transitions on states.
surance family that addresses the assurances for generating
the configuration vector and for establishing the correctness
of the configuration vector drives the need for an explicit
requirement.
This explicit requirement compels the developer to pro-
vide a design that can be evaluated to assure that the con-
figuration tool is trustworthy to perform its functions. The
wording of the explicit requirement specifies the level of
rigor as “informal style at a level of abstraction and detail
required in the TOE high-level design document.”
5.4.3 Functional Specification (ADV FSP)
The MR CIM has an explicit component
ADV FSP (EXP).1 for FSP. Inspection of the SKPP
ADV FSP EXP.4 reveals that its explicit differences have
been influenced by the MR CIM ADV FSP (EXP).1.
The additional requirements, as described in the SKPP
rationale, are necessary to provide the evaluator sufficient
information to assess the intended use and behavior of
each kernel external interface. Before adding these explicit
differences, the SKPP escalated the component from
ADV FSP.3 to ADV FSP.4, which differs solely by a
change from semiformal to formal style. This permits the
correspondence demonstration between the security policy
model and the functional specification to be formal for a
high-robustness separation kernel.
For the medium-robustness separation kernel we employ
a similar strategy. We escalate ADV FSP.2 from CC EAL
4 to ADV FSP.3, which changes the functional specifica-
tion from informal to semiformal style, and then add the
additional requirements levied by the SKPP. The change
to semiformal style works hand-in-hand with the formal
ADV SPM requirement to permit a meaningful semiformal
correspondence demonstration.
5.4.4 High-Level Design (ADV HLD)
The SKPP and the MR CIM both specify explicit re-
quirements for HLD. That of the SKPP is based on CC
ADV HLD.4 but is tailored to take into account the struc-
ture of the separation kernel and has fewer elements
than ADV HLD.4. Following this pattern, the medium-
robustness requirement would be ADV HLD EXP.2, a sim-
ilarly tailored version of ADV HLD.2.
The SKPP ADV HLD EXP.4 calls for a semiformal
style supported by informal explanatory text for the TSF,
and an informal style for the non-TSF. It is the difference in
rigor between TSF and non-TSF that differentiates the re-
quirements for the high-robustness SK from that of a “best
practice” high-level design with typical good software en-
gineering discipline and documentation. We believe that
reducing the rigor requirement to informal is acceptable for
medium robustness. Note that it may be more difficult to
distinguish and separate the TSF from the non-TSF if the
design was created without having such differentiation as
an objective.
5.4.5 Implementation Representation (ADV IMP)
For medium robustness we follow the MR CIM by employ-
ing ADV IMP.2.
5.4.6 Trusted Initialization (ADV INI)
Trusted initialization continues the chain of assurance main-
tained through distribution and configuration by other re-
quirements, but there was not an assurance family for it
in the Common Criteria. Trusted Initialization was explic-
itly added by the SKPP. Because the TOE must be able to
initialize and establish a secure initial state autonomously,
without any intervention by authorized administrators, as-
surances are required for trusted initialization of the TOE
when that initialization is accomplished without the aid of
authorized administrators. The initialization function is re-
sponsible for trusted initialization of the TOE which in-
cludes establishing the execution environment for the TSF
and establishing the TSF in its initial secure state. Since the
initialization function is part of the TOE but not part of the
TSF, it is not subject to most of the ADV documentation
SARs.
For a medium-robustness separation kernel we adopt the
same requirement used in the SKPP. The ADV INI EXP.1
requirement is levied in recognition that establishment of
a secure initial state is fundamental to a proof of the basic
security theorem. Although the initialization function is not
part of the TSF, the conversion of configuration vectors into
the TSF data must be shown to preserve the semantics of
the configuration data.. This requirement provides a design
for the initialization function to the extent it is not included
in the design of the TSF.
5.4.7 TSF Internals (ADV INT)
This requirement addresses the internal structure of the TSF.
The TSF Internals requirement is a CC component that is
one of the primary factors contributing to the conventional
wisdom that pre-existing products can only be evaluated to
EAL 4 (without being redesigned and reimplemented). The
standard CC EAL 4 package does not include an ADV INT
requirement. For medium robustness we follow the MR
CIM by employing ADV INT (EXP).1. This requirement
is substantially more specific than ADV INT.1 in the CC
(the standard component for EAL 5). The software engi-
neering discipline entailed by this explicit requirement may
challenge pre-existing implementations not developed with
this requirement in mind.
5.4.8 Low-Level Design (ADV LLD)
For medium robustness we adopt ADV LLD (EXP).1 of
the MR CIM. This requirement is more specific than
ADV LLD.1 and is apparently intended to work together
with ADV INT (EXP).1 to enforce more stringent software
engineering practices. The presentation style required is
still informal.
5.4.9 Load Tool Design (ADV LTD)
Like the configuration tool, this assurance family is not
present in the Common Criteria but is explicitly added by
the SKPP.
The ADV LTD EXP requirement is levied in recogni-
tion that the load tool is a crucial part of the TOE’s evalua-
tion because it is part of the chain that establishes the initial
state, thus having a direct bearing on the ability to provide
an inductive proof of the basic security theorem. Through
the ADV class, essential assurance measures are applied to
security critical components within the TOE; however, be-
cause it is not part of the executable kernel, these measures
would not be applied to the load tool. An explicit require-
ment levied specifically on the load tool requires the devel-
oper to provide a load tool design that can be evaluated for
assurance that it is trustworthy to perform its functions.
5.4.10 Representation Correspondence (ADV RCR)
The SKPP escalates the EAL 6 component ADV RCR.2 to
ADV RCR.3 because the SKPP requires formal FSP and
SPM. The FSP and SPM proposed for medium-robustness
separation kernels by this work are semiformal and formal
respectively. We therefore escalate the medium-robustness
requirement to ADV RCR.2 over the EAL 4 component
ADV RCR.1 (also specified in the MR CIM).
5.4.11 Security Policy Modeling (ADV SPM)
The CC has an idiosyncracy in the usage of the ADV SPM
class in the standard EAL packages, in that the semiformal
component is not used in any EAL. SPM is informal at EAL
4 and formal at EAL 5 and above.
We have chosen to utilize the CC ADV SPM.3 com-
ponent, a formal security policy model, for the medium-
robustness separation kernel. In this way a meaningful
semiformal correspondence demonstration can be done be-
tween the formal security policy model and the semiformal
functional specification.
5.5 Guidance Documents
The Common Criteria defines only one component for
each of the families AGD ADM and AGC USR. The SKPP
creates an explicit component, AGD ADM EXP.1 because
separation kernel specific considerations result in a number
of explicit requirements that must be mirrored in the ad-
ministrator guidance. For medium robustness we adopt the
same requirements as the SKPP, viz., AGD ADM EXP.1
and AGD USR.1.
5.6 Life Cycle Support
The ALC class contains the families: Development Se-
curity (DVS), Flaw Remediation (FLR), Life Cycle Defini-
tion (LCD), and Techniques and Tools (TAT). The Common
Criteria does not utilize the FLR family in any of the EAL
packages. The SKPP and the MR CIM both, however, in-
clude a component from the FLR family.
For medium robustness we follow the MR CIM for ALC
families DVS, FLR and LCD by requiring ALC DVS.1,
ALC FLR.2, and ALC LCD.1. For the Techniques and
Tools family, however, we believe that the ALC TAT.1 com-
ponent required by the MR CIM is too weak for a newly
developed TOE, which a separation kernel is likely to be,
and instead require ALC TAT.2.
The specific difference between ALC TAT.1 and
ALC TAT.2 is that the subset of the implementation defined
by the ADV IMP family (we have specified ADV IMP.2,
following the MR CIM) must comply with explicitly stated
implementation standards, and that the evaluator must con-
firm that the standards have been applied. The Common
Criteria neglects to state where those implementation stan-
dards are to be defined, so we would add an application
note to suggest that the developer provide a Techniques and
Tools document that includes the definition of the imple-
mentation standards to be applied, as well as the other con-
tent items required by ALC TAT.2.
5.7 Maintenance of Assurance
For the SKPP, the explicit component
AMA AMP EXP.1 was written to define the require-
ments for an assurance maintenance plan.
While it may be debatable whether the use of
AMA AMP EXP.1 is required only for the high robustness
requirement and not for medium robustness, the benefits of
assurance maintenence to the developer of a TOE at any
robustness level should be recognized. The reality of prod-
uct change and the cost of evaluation should make apparent
the benefits of minimizing reevaluation cost. A well-written
Assurance Maintenance Plan (AMP) effectively permits the
evaluators to evaluate “at once” the TOE in all variations
that the AMP can successfully justify to not require reeval-
uation. As a practical matter, this should also be a require-
ment for medium robustness separation kernels.
5.8 Platform Assurance
The MR CIM specifies that domain separation require-
ments (FPT SEP) must be included in a medium robust-
ness TOE, and thus the underlying hardware mechanisms
that the TOE depends on to support its security architec-
ture must also be included as part of the TOE. To date, the
CC does not include requirements for assessing the assur-
ance of hardware components used to implement a TOE’s
security functions. Since it is difficult for TOE vendors to
produce assurance evidence for hardware at the same level
of detail that is required for software, it was necessary to
introduce a separate assurance class in the SKPP to pro-
vide a framework for establishing the security relevance of
commercially-available hardware based on its interaction
with software through its interfaces. As noted in the ra-
tionale for the explicit Platform Assurance (APT) class, the
overall approach is to define platform components in terms
of specification instead of identification. This is to address
the long-standing problem that specific hardware compo-
nents identified in a TOE’s evaluated configuration become
obsolete during or immediately after the TOE’s evaluation.
5.8.1 Platform Definition (APT PDF)
This family requires a description of the platform in terms
of platform components that can be obtained and assembled
by the end users. The Platform Definition Document (PDD)
must include the assembly rules and information about the
types, interfaces and security properties of the components
to support component-specific security analysis against the
SFRs. The CC component leveling for this family is deter-
mined based on the details provided in the PDD. For high
robustness, the SKPP mandates the highest level, i.e., the
PDD must include precise component interface specifica-
tions for all platform components in addition to the platform
component security analysis. The evaluator is also required,
at the highest level, to verify a subset of the interface specifi-
cations to ensure that they provide adequate information on
component compatibility. Based on the MR CIM guidance
that “the level of detail of design documentation and the
implementation representation is dependent upon a compo-
nent’s role in security policy enforcement,” we propose to
relax both of these content and evaluator requirements for
medium robustness separation kernels. Specifically, the re-
quired details of the component interface specifications can
be less rigorous, i.e., interface specifications are only re-
quired for components that directly affect the implemen-
tation of the policy enforcement SFRs, and the evaluator
will not be required to verify the interface specifications for
compatibility information.
5.8.2 Platform Specification (APT PSP)
This family levies requirements on the vendor-supplied
specifications of the interfaces provided by the platform
components. These specifications are necessary to support
functional analysis and vulnerability assessment of the TSF.
Three CC component levels are defined for this family. The
highest level, as specified in the SKPP, requires complete
specifications of all platform interfaces (i.e., external, inter-
nal and unused internal interfaces). The middle level only
requires a complete specification of the external platform
interfaces while the basic level simply requires the identifi-
cation of the external interfaces. For medium robustness,
it is sufficient to downgrade to the middle level because
a complete specification of the external interfaces can fa-
cilitate a critical examination of the hardware functionality
that is externally visible to the TOE software which, in turn,
can help support the analysis for design correctness and ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities of the TSF.
5.8.3 Platform Conformance Testing (APT PCT)
Regarding hardware testing, the SKPP makes a distinction
between testing at the platform component interface and
testing at the TSFI interface. This family addresses the lat-
ter whose goal is to ensure that the platform components
identified in the PDD function as expected by the TSF soft-
ware. Testing at the component interface level is covered in
the APT PST family described below. The CC component
leveling of this family is based on the scope and rigor of the
required tests. To satisfy the basic level, the TOE developer
is only required to demonstrate that the components provide
the functional features required by a valid hardware plat-
form. The middle and highest levels, on the other hand, fo-
cus more on exercising the security features provided by the
components. The middle level requires testing of only the
security features upon which the TSF depends. The highest
level requires testing of all security features that are relied
upon by the TSF as well as other hardware components.
Since exhaustive test coverage is not required for medium
robustness, it is logical to use the middle level for medium
robustness separation kernels.
5.8.4 Platform Security Testing (APT PST)
This family defines requirements for security testing of
hardware components to be performed at the component in-
terface level. As noted in its rationale, “the intent of this
class is to make deterministic tests of the platform mecha-
nism rather than relying on test coverage arguments at the
TSFI level.” The shift in the testing focus places a stronger
emphasis on security assessment to determine how well the
components satisfy the SFRs. Two CC component levels
are defined for this class. Only external platform interfaces
are required for the basic level while all external and inter-
nal interfaces are required for the second level. Naturally,
the SKPP utilizes the second level. Since it is anticipated
that a thorough testing of the platform mechanisms that are
externally visible can provide enough evidence that the ex-
ternal platform interfaces function correctly and can mod-
erately resist attacks, it seems appropriate to levy the basic
level requirements on a medium robustness separation ker-
nel
5.8.5 Platform Vulnerability Assessment (APT PVA)
This family complements the AVA VLA family by requir-
ing that hardware vulnerability assessment be considered
as part of the software vulnerability analysis. Similar to
APT PST, the difference between the two CC component
levels defined is based on the type of platform interfaces in-
volved in the assessment, i.e., only external interface (basic
level) versus both external and internal interfaces (second
level). The same argument used in the APT PST also ap-
plies here and thus, the basic level prevails.
5.9 Tests
The ATE class contains the assurance families: Analy-
sis of Coverage (COV), Depth of Testing (DPT), Functional
Testing (FUN), and Independent Testing (IND). In each of
these families the medium-robustness separation kernel re-
quirements adopt those of the MR CIM.
5.10 Vulnerability Assessment
The AVA class contains the assurance families: Covert
Channel Analysis (CCA), Misuse (FLR), Strength of Func-
tion (SOF), and Vulnerability Analysis (VLA).
5.10.1 Covert Channel Analysis (AVA CCA)
For the CCA family the SKPP specifies an explicit compo-
nent AVA CCA EXP.2, based on AVA CCA.2, but limited
to cover only inter-partition covert channels. One would
expect that the covert channel analysis requirement for MR
would cover only inter-partition covert channels, whatever
the level of rigor of the search.
The MR CIM, on the other hand, has a different ex-
plicit component AVA CCA (EXP).2, that requires system-
atic covert channel analysis of the cryptographic module
only. It contains an application note that explains that the
TSF interfaces are not covered because it is “considered
beyond the scope of effort and cost considered reasonable
for COTS medium-robustness products.” It goes on to ac-
knowledge that this does increase risk.
Experience has shown that it is likely that the exercise of
conducting a covert channel search, even one that is not sys-
tematic, may expose channels that can and should be miti-
gated, and can yield valuable information about the TOE to
be captured in guidance documentation.
In applying the MR CIM rationale to the medium-
robustness separation kernel, it is clear that that the MR
CIM requirement for systematic covert channel analysis of
the cryptographic module does not apply because the sepa-
ration kernel provides no cryptographic services. But there
are a few issues particularly relevant to separation kernels.
The purpose of a separation kernel is to control informa-
tion flow; any other function is arguably incidental. Per-
haps special consideration for separation kernels is needed.
Even at medium-robustness, some covert channel analysis
would be beneficial, such as the informal search specified
by AVA CCA.1, which normally comes into play in the
Common Criteria EAL 5 package.
For the medium-robustness separation kernel, the
covert channel search could be limited to inter-partition
information flow policy, thus creating an explicit com-
ponent AVA CCA EXP.1 analogous to the SKPP’s
AVA CCA EXP.2.
5.10.2 Misuse (AVA MSU)
For MSU the SKPP follows the EAL 6 component and the
MR CIM follows the EAL 4 component. For medium-
robustness separation kernels, the component specified
by the MR CIM, AVA MSU.2 Validation of Analysis is
adopted.
5.10.3 Strength of Function (AVA SOF)
The Common Criteria defines only one component for the
SOF family. The SKPP and the MR CIM both adopt
AVA SOF.1, as does this study. As noted in the SKPP,
these AVA SOF requirements are only applicable to the ad-
ditional security requirements defined in the Security Target
for which a claim of strength of function is appropriate.
5.10.4 Vulnerability Analysis (AVA VLA)
For the VLA family the SKPP creates an explicit require-
ment that modifies AVA VLA.4 only in the evaluator ac-
tions: it requires that an NSA evaluator conduct indepen-
dent vulnerability analysis and penetration testing not build-
ing on developer vulnerability analysis.
The MR CIM elevates the VLA requirement
AVA VLA.2, specified by the EAL 4 package, to
AVA VLA.3 Moderately Resistant, which requires
that the vulnerability search be demonstrably systematic.
This is what we adopt for the MR SK.
6 “Catch-22” Challenges
The absence of a validated PP for medium-robustness
separation kernels poses a challenge for developers.
The Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) Robustness FAQ responds to the question, “can
a TOE/ST claim a robustness level without conforming to
a PP?” with the answer, “For Medium or High Robustness,
this would be theoretically possible if there were an ST Re-
view Board (analogous to the PP Review Board) that would
review the ST to ensure that it adheres to the rules set forth
in the Consistency Instruction Manuals. There currently is
no such group, so there is no way to claim a Medium or
High Robustness level without claiming conformance to a
PP.” Likewise, the IAG position also refers to a security
target, which it says should conform to a currently non-
existent protection profile. Further, the position that a pro-
tection profile acceptable to NSA must be a “U.S. Govern-
ment Protection Profile,” and that such a PP can be devel-
oped only by NSA, leads to an effective impasse for devel-
opers. The upshot of this dilemma is that either a proper
protection profile needs to be developed by NSA, or a non-
NSA produced PP would need to be endorsed by NSA.
7 Summary and Conclusions
We have presented security functional and assurance
requirements for a medium-robustness separation kernel.
Rather than performing a deep protection profile-style anal-
ysis of security environment and objectives, we drew upon
the SKPP and guidance documents to interpolate the re-
quirements informally, following a methodology that may
serve as an example for future efforts to interpolate medium
robustness requirements corresponding to future high ro-
bustness PPs.
The SKPP differs in important ways from the standard
EAL 6 package. This is due to special factors that arise for a
separation kernel qua separation kernel. These factors must
also be given consideration when determining the require-
ments for a MR SK. Consequently, the MR SK assurance
components do not follow the MR CIM in every detail, but
in some cases follow the pattern of the SKPP instead.
Although our results are not intended to replace a
medium-robustness separation kernel protection profile,
they do provide a step in that direction. They adopt vir-
tually all of the SKPP functional requirements and have
met or exceeded all of the MR-CIM (and EAL 4) assurance
requirements, on a few items equalling the SKPP require-
ments. Absent a protection profile, the requirements pre-
sented herein constitute a conservative basis for proceeding
with medium-robustness separation kernel development.
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